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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 17234 
NATHAN J. HILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUVENILES HAVE A RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUVENILE PROCEEDING HAS 
RESULTED IN CONFINEMENT. 
The gravamen of the respondent's first argument is 
that the United States Constitution provides no right to 
counsel to juveniles if the juvenile proceeding does not 
result in confinement. Respondent cites Scott v. Illinois, 
440 U.S. 367, 99 s.ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), in 
which the Supreme Court held: 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution require only that no indigent 
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment unless the state, has afforded 
him the right to assistance of appointed counsel. 
99 S.Ct. 1162. 
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that these cases are distinguishable because the defen-
dants in these cases "were sentenced to prison terms." 
(Respondent's brief at 14) Again it must be repeated 
that the incarceration or non-incarceration distinction 
relied upon here by the respondent has not been accepted 
in the case of a juvenile as shown by the Gault decision. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, 
Section 12, provides the juvenile in the instant case a 
right to counsel. In State v. Eichler, 25 U.2d 421, 483 
P.2d 887 (Utah 1971), the court held that: 
It is in accordance with the assurance of the 
State Constitution that an accused be provided 
with the assistance of counsel at every 
important stage of the proceeding against him 
inasmuch as such a hearing involves the 
possibility of changing the defendant's status 
from one of being at liberty to one of being 
in confinement. 483 P.2d at 889. 
The Utah Constitution, independent of the United States 
Constitution, is consistent with Gault in protecting the 
right to counsel. The Utah Constitutional protection is 
broader than Scott and does not require confinement before 
a defendant has a right to counsel. 
POINT II 
THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO DENY APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA ONLY IF THAT 
PLEA WAS VALID IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. 
The respondent argues that under Utah law a judge 
has discretion to allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn 
-4-
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before judgment. The respondent cites State v. Forsyth, 
560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), in which the court said that 
"the trial judge is allowed considerable latitude in the 
exercise of that discretion." 560 P.2d at 339 However, 
the Forsyth court had already determined that the guilty 
plea was a valid one: 
We are in full agreement with the proposition 
that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must 
appear that the accused had a clear under-
standing of the charge without undue influence, 
coercion, or improper inducement voluntarily 
entered such plea. On the basis of the 
questions asked, on those matters and the 
defendant's answers thereto, there is ample 
basis for the trial court's conclusion that 
the just stated standard was met. 560 P.2d at 339. 
The court plainly says that once the court has established 
that the guilty plea is a valid one, then the judge has 
discretion to withdraw it or leave it in place. Validity 
of the plea is a requisite to the judge's discretion. 
In the instant case the plea is not a valid one. 
The court's test that the appellant must make the plea 
with a "clear understanding of the charge and without 
undue influence" is not met. The appellant did not fully 
understand the charge against him, nor the range of 
possible punishments. The appellant had also been 
influenced by the court's probation officer to make his 
plea of guilty. Since the plea is not a valid one, the 
judge has no such discretion as to its withdrawal. 
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POINT III 
THE PRESENCE OF THE APPELLANT'S FATHER AND 
PROBATION OFFICER AT THE JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS 
DOES NOT END THE INQUIRY INTO WHETHER HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED. 
The respondent has asserted that in the instant 
case the inference that a juvenile's waiver of counsel is 
not intelligently made is "rebutted by the fact that 
appellant's father, who was present when the plea was 
made, concurred with his son that they did not want to 
consult with counsel." (Respondent's brief at 11) An 
Arizona case relied upon by the respondent, Application 
of Estrada, 403 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1965), (mistakenly referred 
to in Respondent's brief as Suiter v. Kurtz) suggests that 
the absence of relatives from the proceeding is only one 
factor in determining whether waiver of counsel was 
intelligent. 
Focusing on the father's presence at a juvenile 
proceeding is not dispositive of the issue of whether the 
waiver was intelligently made by the juvenile, especially 
when as in this case the father has testified that he did 
not understand the charges. In some circumstances the 
influence or pressure of a parent may even have the effect 
of characterizing the waiver as non-voluntary. In Re H., 
Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204 (1970), is a case in which the 
California court decided that a waiver was invalid because 
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the decision to waive was based on parental influence 
which was not in the interest of the juvenile. Likewise, 
the presence and advice of a probation officer cannot be 
used to establish intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel. The court in Gault said that the presence of a 
probation officer does not show that the defendant 
intelligently waived his rights. The court noted that the 
probation officer is not acting as the child's counsel 
and in fact is an instrument of the court. 387 U.S. at 36 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant submits that the court erroneously 
refused his motion to withdraw his admission. The appel-
lant does have a right to counsel in the adjudicatory 
stage of any proceeding in which he faces the risk of 
confinement. This right was not intelligently waived and 
the presence of appellant's father and probation officer 
does not establish intelligent waiver. Further, the 
appellant submits that since the appellant's plea was 
invalid the judge had no discretion but should have allowed 
the appellant to withdraw it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/S/:~~~~~~~~~ 
ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER 
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